

**TOP SECRET**

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31 January 1962

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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## DAILY BRIEF



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Congo: [Pierre Mulele, Gizenga's representative in Cairo, reportedly intends to instigate terrorist activity in Leopoldville to protest Gizenga's detention. Mulele, who appears to command ample funds, is also planning to exploit various Afro-Asian conferences on behalf of Gizenga. Although Gizenga's prestige in the Congo has been declining, his detention may be used by such leftists as Mulele and Interior Minister Gbenye as a means of rallying anti-Adoula elements. Mulele has indicated that "if anything happens" to Gizenga, he plans "to assume the mantle of Lumumba and Gizenga" and the leadership of Congolese "nationalists"]

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Continuing bloc solicitude for Gizenga--reflected in commentaries and protests on his behalf in Moscow and elsewhere--suggests that the bloc hopes to take credit for saving Gizenga from Lumumba's fate. While Adoula has taken action to provide for Gizenga's physical safety, the government apparently plans to bring him to trial for secessionist activities. [The Belgian Communist party reportedly has retained lawyers for Gizenga.]

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India-Pakistan: [Krishna Menon's confidence in his ability to increase support in the UN for India's position on the Kashmir dispute apparently was an important factor in New Delhi's decision to turn down the US' offer of its good offices. Nehru reportedly told President Prasad on 23 January that Menon had strongly advised against accepting any proposals for negotiation pending the outcome of Pakistan's current effort to obtain UN action on the Kashmir question. Menon argued that a majority of nations might well support a pro-Indian resolution should the issue be taken to the General Assembly. Nehru, in resisting Prasad's heated arguments]

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[In favor of negotiations, reiterated his opposition to any action at this time which would change the status quo.]

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[The Pakistani UN delegation on 29 January requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council, which has been seized of the question since early 1948, to consider the "threat" posed by New Delhi's stand on Kashmir. The council is scheduled to take up the matter on 1 February. Pakistani officials anticipate a Soviet veto of any council action unfavorable to India and are themselves doubtful that they can muster the necessary support in the General Assembly, but New Delhi's intransigence probably has increased their determination to step up the international pressure on India.]

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\*Venezuela: The Venezuelan Government, in apprehending a number of Communist leaders, is taking precautions against a Communist uprising reportedly timed to coincide with the end of the Punta del Este meeting. The Communists are reported making a concerted effort to organize leftist support among the military for a coup attempt against President Betancourt. A large number of noncommissioned officers are said to have been arrested for subversive agitation among rural groups. According to the Caracas press the authorities have discovered a well-supplied training camp for guerrillas in eastern Venezuela. Among the persons arrested in this connection were three Venezuelans who allegedly had received guerrilla training in Cuba.

Government security forces have thus far remained loyal to Betancourt, and the top-ranking commanders are predominantly anti-Communist. Communist influence among the military is confined largely to some junior and noncommissioned officers and recruits. In addition to seizing large quantities of arms in the possession of opposition groups, the government has arrested over 800 persons involved in the violence which has occurred since 22 January.


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**\*France-Algeria:** Press reports that an agreement has been reached between Paris and the PAG on an Algerian settlement could spark a putsch by the OAS, (whose leaders have been apprehensive lest a delay following public acknowledgment of an accord give the Europeans in Algeria time to realize their future would not be so black as the OAS has painted it. Absence of an immediate OAS reaction will not mean extremist acceptance of Algerian independence, however, since OAS leaders have been debating the merits of striking at once or awaiting implementation of an agreement. An attempt may be made to achieve a de facto partition which would permit them to try to maneuver the army into defying orders from Paris.) Barring immediate official confirmation of the reported agreement, the OAS may postpone action until De Gaulle's 5 February television speech.

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Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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